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Abstract
Producing a cost-benet analyses of security solutions has always
been hard, because the benets are difcult to assess and often only
a part of the overall cost is clear. Despite this, today the provi-
sion of economic evaluations of security technology investments is
a requirement that more and more customers ask vendors to sat-
isfy. In this paper, we consider the typical calculation of a Return-
On-Investment (ROI) index based on the evaluation of the Annual
Loss Expectancy (ALE), as the one provided usually by vendors of
IT security. Our motivating assumption is that such classical in-
dex, the ROI, provides a partial characterization of investments in
information security technology, because it lacks to explicitly con-
sider attackers’ behavior. We suggest that to better evaluate secu-
rity technology investments, the ROI index should be coupled with
a corresponding index aimed at measuring the convenience of at-
tacks, the Return-On-Attack (ROA) expecially in situation where
different technologies are combined or where the possible degrada-
tion of a security solution’s efciency over time must be taken into
account.
1 Introduction
The importance of information security increased enormously in
the last few years in the consideration of customers of information
technology (IT) solutions. It is sufcient to walk into a kiosk to nd
out that all IT publications have now a security-related section and
dozen of different magazines dedicated to IT security are available.
IT security importance has also driven new investments: statistics
show that almost the totality of rms have antivirus and rewalls in
place and a large number of organizations have developed projects
aimed at protecting their assets from information security threats.
However, it has been often also observed that this increase of infor-
mation security expenditures was driven mostly by emotional reac-
tions to new perceived risks rather than by pragmatic cost-benet
analyses of the available solutions.
One of the problems that security managers must tackle is to pro-
vide a right evaluation of different security plans and to estimate
costs and benets of technologies without having tangible data. Se-
curity technology benets depend on how often an attack is ex-
pected, which damage is likely to occur and how effective the se-
curity technology is in mitigating the damage caused by attacks.
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Communication gaps between security managers and IT managers
have been often reported, resulting in decisions that do not fully
take into account both the economic convenience and the technical
effectiveness.
The discipline studying the economics of information security tech-
nology investments has already provided some relevant results and
analyses [1, 2, 4, 5, 6], although probably not yet well understood
and accepted in the large. In this context, our work is motivated by
observing that many vendors seem now aware of the necessity of
providing an economic justication of the costs of their solutions,
instead the analyses that often are provided appear severely incom-
plete and sometimes misleading. In particular, ROI-based evalu-
ations, the ones usually provided, in our opinion suffer of many
weaknesses and are intrinsically incomplete. In this paper we pro-
pose an approach to improve ROI-based evaluations by integrating
them with a new index, called Return-On-Attack (ROA), aimed at
measuring the convenience of attacks. The ROA index reects the
average and supposed impact of a security solution on attackers’ be-
haviors. The goal is to identify the solution that mostly discourage
attackers in their intrusion attempts, an aspect that the usual ROI
analysis does not identify clearly.
2 Return-on-Attack (ROA)
In our analysis, we started from the typical calculation of a Return-
On-Investment (ROI) index, based on the evaluation of the Annual
Loss Expectancy (ALE), the expected efciency of adopted secu-
rity solutions and their corresponding costs. The cost-benet model
presented by Wei et al. [7] and Foster [3], for example, like many
other studies, has considered such elements applied to information
security technologies and has modeled the ROI index as follows:
ROI = ALEbe f oreS
  ALEa f terS
cost o f security measure
 EFF  CI   CS
CS
 EFF  CI
CS
 1
The relation can be derived starting from a security measure S and
estimating ALEbe f oreS, which represents the annual costs related to
all security incidents that the security measure S is well-suited to
mitigate. We call CI these annual costs, and then ALEbe f oreS equals
CI . These costs may include both tangible and intangible losses,
such as costs for data recovery, in the rst case, or damage to the
reputation, in the second. The term ALEa f terS is composed by two
parts. The rst one is the annual cost that the rm still suffers from
security incidents that security measure S should have been able to
avoid, but actually did not. This term is calculated as the difference
between losses before the adoption of security measure S, that is
ALEbe f oreS, and the fraction of these losses saved due to the adop-
tion of S. That fraction, called EFF, with EFF included in [0,1],
represents the efciency of security measure S, and the savings on
losses are then represented by EFF  ALEbe f oreS. The second part
of ALEa f terS is the cost of the security measure S, called CS.
Our motivating assumption is that such classical index, the ROI,
provides a partial characterization of investments in information se-
curity technology, because it lacks to explicitly consider attackers’
interests. Assuming that the organization’s loss is equal to the at-
tacker gain is often a gross simplication. Also, the cost of an at-
tack cannot be directly related to the cost of the security measure
because different solutions at different costs might be perceived as
equally expensive to break from the attacker’s viewpoint.
To this end, we suggest that to better evaluate security technology
investments, the ROI index should be coupled with a corresponding
index aimed at measuring how the attacker’s convenience changes
with the adoption of the same security measure S. We have called
it Return-On-Attack (ROA) and it is dened as the gain the attacker
expects from a successful attack over the losses that he sustains due
to the adoption of security measure S by his target. In this de-
nition of ROA, the expected gain due to a successful attack is the
independent term that we assume to be constant. The dependent
term is the cost of the attack that may vary. It is important to high-
light that the ROA is the evaluation an organization does about the
effectiveness of a security measure in discouraging a certain class
of intrusion attempts assuming some proles of potential attackers.
This means that it does not exactly correspond to the ROI calcu-
lated by a specic attacker in the evaluation of his investment. The
two perspectives are not necessary the same, although both largely
based on perceptions about costs, gains and efcacy.
Similarly to the ROI calculation, we call GI the expected gain from
the incident, CA the perceived cost sustained by the attacker to suc-
ceed and EFF

the efciency of the attacker to violate security mea-
sures. We can then state that:
ROA = gain f rom success f ul attackcost be f ore S  loss caused by S
 GI
CAbe f oreS  CAa f terS   CAbe f oreS 	

GI
CA
EFF

be f oreS

CA
EFF

a f terS
 
CA
EFF

be f oreS
	

GI
CA
EFF

a f terS
We make the following assumption:
The attacker’s efciency to violate security measures corresponds
to the inability of security measures to impair his attacks. Thus, for
a security measure S with efciency EFF, the attacker’s efciency
EFF

is equal to 1-EFF.
Then, we correlate ROA with the efciency EFF of S:
ROA = GICA
EFF


GI
CA
1 
 EFF

GI
CA
 1  EFF 
¿From the attacker’s viewpoint, ROA must be maximized. Conse-
quently, from the defender’s viewpoint, aiming at evaluating invest-
ment in security measure S, the ROA must be minimized.
3 Using ROI and ROA
Let us now show how the conjunction of ROI and ROA could im-
prove the evaluation of IT security investments. In particular, we
will present cases where the ROI alone could lead to ambiguous re-
sults. Although our cases are purposely tailored to stress negative
consequences, we believe they actually represent models of real sit-
uations. Two aspects concerning ROI are stressed:
 ROI alone helps understand whether an investment provides
for a positive return, but does not permit to compare two so-
lutions, both yielding a positive ROI, based on the disadvan-
tages they provide to attackers;
 After the adoption of a technology, and the positive evalua-
tion of the corresponding investment, the context may change
for several reasons, both technical and economic. The ROI
does not take into account compensations between the cost of
a security solution and its efciency, which may result in un-
changed ROI values but different efcacy and convenience of
the solutions.
For instance, consider the following simplied case study with two
potential solutions for contrasting script kiddies: hardened operat-
ing systems and an host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS).
Assume that EFFHOS, the efciency of hardening OSs (HOS), is
75%, while the EFFHIDS is 33%. The annual cost of intrusion due
to script kiddies is $1.000, the cost of the HIDS is $300 and the cost
of HOS is $100.
ROIHOS  0  75
 1000
CSHOS
 1  750CSHOS
 1  1  5
ROIHIDS  0  33
 1000
CSHIDS
 1  333CSHIDS
 1  2  33
According to this example, the HIDS will be chosen over HOS.
Let’s look at corresponding ROA by approximating the term GICA
with the number N of intrusions. Suppose N  10.
ROAHOS  N  1  EFF   N  0  25  2  5
ROAHIDS  N  1  EFF   N  0  66  6  6
Even with this gross estimation, we can observe that the different
efciency in discouraging attackers may lead to different conclu-
sions with respect to the only ROI analysis. What the ROI does not
capture is the difference between mitigating the effects of attacks
and discouraging attackers by making their efforts no longer prof-
itable. In the rst case, the attacker’s target still remains protable
but with a reduced margin and he may be pushed to pay more (i.e.
attacking more frequently, with more sophisticated techniques, or
looking for different vulnerabilities) for raising his gain. In short,
an attacker may suffer losses but at the same time be encouraged to
act more efciently. In our example, the HOS solution results in a
ROA of 2.5, meaning that the attacker could gain just two hosts for
his purposes. This sensible reduction with respect to the situation
before hardening OSs could induce the attacker to change his target
instead of paying more.
This simple example let us introduce another aspect that involves
the ROI analysis: the modications in the environment with respect
to the time of the ROI evaluation and how these modications could
be compensated in the ROI analysis. Consider again the ROI for-
mula and a certain ROI value, say ROIt0 the one calculated at time
t0 when a security solution S was chosen. One goal of investments
is that their convenience do not decrease over time with respect to
the time of the evaluation (at least within a certain time frame).
Thus, we want that the value ROIt0 will remain constant. How-
ever, the same value ROIt0 could be obtained at following time t1
either because the values of EFF, CI and CS are unchanged or as
a result of compensations. For example, if EFFt1  12
 EFFt0 and
CIt1  CIt0 , and CSt1  12
 CSt0 , then ROIt1  ROIt0 . This example,
although over-simplied, points out a problem of ROI and of secu-
rity technology investments evaluation: the effectiveness of security
technology investments could degrade due to context changes with-
out affecting the ROI index.
For instance, consider a rewall appliance and suppose that at time
t0 it resulted the better choice according to a ROI analysis, provid-
ing a high efciency, say 90%. At time t1, following a management
decision that esteemed too high the costs payed, for example be-
cause due to rewall security policies it became more difcult to
provide new interacting services, the rewall policy has been made
less restrictive (a situation that happens quite often, as documented
by Wool [8]). Is the rewall investment still convenient at time
t1? With the simplications assumed before, EFFt1  12
 EFFt0
and CSt1  12
 CSt0 , the ROI is unchanged, so the management de-
cision seems to have preserved previous invesments. Look at the
ROA, instead, by assuming that GICA is constant between t0 and t1,
EFFt0  90% and 1  EFFt1  1  12
 EFFt0 :
ROAt0  GICA
 0  1
ROAt1  GICA
 1  12
 EFFt0  
GI
CA
 0  55
The convenience to attack the organization increased more than
5 times as a consequence of a management decision that the ROI
could not capture.
Finally, consider the case of a technology that is added to a previous
one and look at the ROI and ROA indexes. For example, we assume
that the previously discussed HOS solution has been applied, as de-
cided at time t0 (CIt0  1000, CSHOS  300, and EFFHOS  75%).
At time t1, the adoption of a new rewall appliance (CSFW  100
and EFFFW  90%) is decided. The loss CI that the rewall miti-
gates is the residual part resulting from the previous adoption of the
HOS solution: CIt1  1000  0  75
 1000  250. Thus, ROIs are:
at time t0: ROIHOSt0  0  75
 1000
300
 1  1  5
at time t1: ROIFWt1  0  9
 250
100
 1  2  25
The ROIFWt1 seems to conrm that the adoption of the rewall in
addition to the previous hardened OS solution is positive. How-
ever, this result might not represent the real situation. For instance,
if the rewall is deployed at network perimeter, as usual, then it
now represents the rst line of defense against attackers, followed
by an inner layer represented by hardened OSs. Hence, ROI eval-
uation changes since it is the rewall investment to be evaluated
with respect to the full ALE (e.g. 1000) and the investment in
hardening OSs with respect to the residual costs for intrusions (e.g.
1000  0  9  1000  100):
at time t1: ROIFW  0  9
 1000
100
 1  8
and ROIHOS  0  75
 100
300
 1   0  75
As a result, the investment in HOSs seems no longer convenient,
according to the ROI. As a consequence, it seems that the HOS
should be dismissed in favour of the rewall alone. Look at ROA:
With FW only: ROAFW  GICA
 1  EFFFW ) = GICA*0.1
With FW and HOS:
EFFFW  HOS  EFFFW +(1-EFFFW )*EFFHOS = 0.975
ROAFW  HOS  GICA
 1  EFFFW  HOS) = GICA*0.025
The ROA seems to conrm that the HOS solution provides
just a small benet because it is applied to marginal attacks that
escape rewall ltering. Then, the small utility and negative
convenience of the HOS could be the conclusion reached by
freezing this scenario at a certain time. However, we have already
observed that it should be taken into account that the efciency
of a certain solution could easily decrease over time. Recall the
scenario seen before when the efciency of the rewall decreased
to 45% due to a management decision and ROA raised to 0.55.
Look at the same case with the addition of the HOS solution:
With FW only: EFFFW = 45% ROAFW = GICA*0.55
With FW and HOS:
EFFFW  HOS = EFFFW +(1-EFFFW )*EFFHOS = 0.86
ROAFW  HOS = GICA *(1-EFFFW  HOS) = GICA*0.1375
The presence of the HOS, although it resulted not convenient
according to the ROI index and providing few benets according
to the rst calculation of the ROA, proved to be important as a
second line of defense because it permits to keep the total efcacy
(i.e. EFFFW  HOS) of the security architecture at a good 86%,
despite the drop of the rewall efcacy from 90% to 45%. As
a consequence, the ROA calculated after the rewall’s efcacy
dropped, shows just a small increase, from 0.1 to 0.1375, instead
of jumping to 0.55 as without the hardened OS protection.
4 Conclusion
The principal consideration of this work is that the ROI alone is
unable to catch the different impact that solutions have on attack-
ers’ behaviors and do not take into account the variations of secu-
rity solutions efciency due to technical or management reasons.
To this end, we have discussed some case studies, which, although
extremely simplied and far from a comprehensive description of
real scenarios, should help and encourage to extend ROI analyses
to provide better evaluations of security technology investments.
In future works we want to examine in greater details the different
case studies in order to provide more precise models, for examples
of script kiddies or spammers. Game theory could certainly help to
rene our analysis. Moreover, the availability of statistical data and
analyses of attackers behavior could be fundamental for better eval-
uations. The area of Honeypot/Honeynet could be one important
source of information.
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